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In  this  thesis,  I  develop  a  theoretical  frame  through  which  the  perpetuation  of  
racial   inequality   in   the   United   States   can   be   fruitfully   interpreted.   This  
reconceptualization  is  necessary,  I  argue,  because  the  now  dominant  paradigm  of  
so-­called   “structural   racism”   is   methodologically   untenable.   I   contend   that   the  
seminal   theoretical   and   empirical   accounts   within   the   paradigm   do   not   provide  
compelling   or  methodologically   sound  explanations   for   the   perpetuation   of   racial  
inequality,  often  (and  disturbingly)  ignoring  the  historical  record  of  race  relations  in  
the   US.   Specifically,   I   show   that   these   accounts   rely   on   the   dubious   causal  
mechanisms  of  structural   inertia  (or,  as  Maynard  &  Wilson  (1980)  put   it,   they  are  
guilty  of  structural  reification),  or  ideological  racism.  Where  these  pitfalls  are  avoided  
or   otherwise   acknowledged,   the   paradigm   is   still   insufficient   in   explaining   the  
persistence   of   racial   inequality   because   it   either   consciously   or   unconsciously  
avoids   contextualizing   the   current   regime   of   racial   inequality   within   the   larger  
historical  role  of  race  in  American  history.  As  such,  it  is  unable  to  explain  the  various  
historical  iterations  of  largescale  social  movements  predicated  on  interracialism  or  
the  wholescale  elimination  of  racial  inequality,  and  these  movements’  subsequent  
liquidation.   In   sum,   the   poverty   of   theories   of   structural   racism   consists   in   their  
profound   lack   of   nuance,   and   their   refusal   to   historicize   race   as   a   sociological  
category.    
I  attempt  to  remedy  these  issues  by  locating  the  causal  impetus  of  racialized  
social   structures   in   the  class   relations  of   the  US.   I  argue   that,  broadly  speaking,  
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workers   pursue   their   interests   collectively   in   one   of   two  ways:   through   race   and  
gender   inclusive,   class-­based   organizations,   or   through   exclusionary   race   and  
gender-­based   organizations.   To   combat   the   possibility   or   reality   of   the   former,  
employers   and   the   state—separately   and   in   conjunction—have   historically  
incentivized  and  encouraged   the   latter   to  avoid  potential   shifts   in   the  balance  of  
class  power.  Building  upon  Piven  &  Cloward  ([1971]  1993)  and  Goldfield  (1989),  I  
argue  that  organized,  interracial,  and  class  solidaristic  social  unrest  leads  not  only  
to   relief   programs   that  assuage  civil   unrest   through   the   implementation  of   social  
welfare  policies  and  other  economic  and  social  concessions,  but,  crucially,  to  relief  
programs  that  are  meant  specifically  to  create  or  intensify  racial  antagonisms  and  
quell  class  solidarity.   I  model   this  relationship  using  what  Erik  Olin  Wright  (2000)  
has  described  as  a  “positive  class  compromise.”  While  Wright’s  conceptualization  
of  a  positive  class  compromise  is  essentially  normative—a  hypothetical  “non-­zero-­
sum  game  between  workers  and  capitalists”  wherein  “both  parties  can  improve  their  
[material  interests]  through  various  forms  of  active,  mutual  cooperation”—I  use  the  
concept   descriptively   to   explain   the   perpetuation   of  white   supremacy   in   the  US,  
given  the  empirical  assumption  of   inherently  antagonistic  class  relations  between  
the  working   class   and   their   employers,   and   the   historic   tendency   of   the   state   to  
restore  and   transform  white  supremacy  after  outbursts  of   interracial,  class-­based  
worker  militancy.  In  other  words,  the  possibility  of  continued  social  unrest  is  curtailed  
by   elevating  white  workers   socially,   politically,   psychologically,   and  economically  
relative  to  non-­white  workers  (see  Fredrickson  1981  p.  69).  White  supremacy,  then,  
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in  its  various  iterations  and  guises,  is  one  of  the  primary  processes  through  which  
the  inherently  antagonistic  class  relations  of  American  capitalism  are  hegemonized.1    
In   Section   1,   I   survey   the   foundational   accounts   within   the   paradigm   of  
structural   racism,  pointing  out   their   individual  methodological   shortcomings  while  
critiquing  the  plausibility  of  the  paradigm  as  a  whole.  In  Section  2,  I  delineate  the  
theoretical  framework  for  a  feasible  theory  of  the  perpetuation  of  racial  inequality.  In  
Section  3,  I  construct  a  model  that  conceptualizes  white  supremacy  as  a  positive  
class  compromise.  In  Section  4,  I  provide  a  cursory  framework  for  interpreting  the  
model   historically.   Section   5   concludes   the   piece,   noting   avenues   for   further  
research,  emphasizing   the   importance  of   labor  market  segregation   in  buttressing  









                                                
1  I  use  “hegemony”  in  the  Gramscian  sense,  denoting  class  relations  that  are  
reproduced  and  sustained  through  the  “active  consent  of  people  in  the  subordinate  
classes,”  rather  than  through  outright  and  constant  coercion  (Wright  2000  p.  964,  
emphasis  in  original).    
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SECTION  1:  METHODOLOGY  AND  STRUCTURAL  RACISM  
Structural   racism,   the   now   dominant   paradigm   within   the   study   of   the  
perpetuation   of   racial   inequality,   argues   that   various   social   institutions   (e.g.,   the  
spatial   organization   of   cities,   housing   markets,   labor   markets,   public   school  
systems,  etc.)  operate,  prima  facie,  according  to  a  racially  neutral  internal  logic,  but,  
in  reality,  produce  racialized  outcomes  to  the  detriment  of  non-­whites  (see  Powell  
2008,   Bonilla-­Silva   1997,   and   Galster   1988   for   a   methodological   overview).   In  
combination,   these   institutions   create   a   social   structure   that   compounds   racial  
disadvantage  and  perpetuates  racial  inequality.  Crucially,  structural  racism  rejects  
explicit  racism  as  a  principle  driver  of  racial  inequality—indeed,  one  of  the  primary  
theoretical   implications   of   structural   racism   is   that   if   we   were   somehow   able   to  
eliminate  explicit  racism—if  we  cast  off  all  of  the  racists  to  an  island  in  the  Pacific—
racial   inequality  would  persist  and  continue  to  renew  itself   (Powell  2008  pp.  794-­
795).2   Traditional   models   of   racialized   outcomes—models   that   rely   on   linear  
causation  from  the  intentional  actions  of  explicitly  racist  actors  to  racialized  harm—
not  only  misrepresent  the  causal  factors  involved  in  racialized  outcomes,  but  they  
also   ignore   empirical   trends   that   illustrate   an   ideological   shift   away   from   explicit  
racism  to  a  “new”  “colorblind”  racism  (Hunt  2004;;  Hunt  2007;;  Merolla,  Hunt,  &  Serpe  
2011;;  Bonilla-­Silva  2014).    Theories  of  structural  racism  shift  the  onus  of  causality  
                                                




away  from  the  individual  and  their  intentions,  to  the  cumulative  effects  of  a  racialized  
social  structures.  
Problematically,   in   eschewing   the   intent   of   actors   in   the   social   system,   it  
becomes  difficult  to  explain  why  racial  inequality  reproduces  itself  and  evolves  over  
time   without   recourse   to   a   kind   of   methodologically   untenable   structural   inertia.  
While  occasionally  paying  lip-­service  to  the  historical  origins  of  the  social  structures  
deemed  particularly   operative   in   the  perpetuation  of   racial   inequality,   theories   of  
structural  racism  rely  substantially  upon  the  self-­perpetuation  of  social  structure  over  
time,  rather  than  causal  mechanisms  grounded  in  the  actions  of  actual  individuals  
in  society.  Much  like  the  deist’s  clockmaker,  theories  of  structural  racism  assume,  
either  explicitly  or  implicitly,  that  once  the  racial  structure  is  in  place,  it  just  “goes.”  
Indeed,  while  the  emphasis  upon  certain  structural  drivers  of  racial  inequality  varies  
widely  between  different  authors,  the  presentation  of  their  arguments  is  fairly  similar.  
In   essence,   the   arguments   are   made   in   two   stages:   first,   influenced   by   racial  
prejudice   and   explicit   discrimination,   various   institutions   have   been   established  
historically  that  operate,  in  tandem,  to  create  racial  inequality;;  second,  the  racialized  
structure,  once  created,  operates  according  to  an  internal  logic  that  agents  passively  
implement  over   time,   leading   to   the  structure’s  self-­perpetuation.  Whereas   in   the  
first  stage  agents  act  purposefully  and  their  actions  create  and  transform  structure,  
agents  in  the  second  stage  are  treated  as  “trägers  [bearers]  or  vectors  of  ulterior  
structural  determinations”—the  social  structure  operates   independently  of  agents’  
intentions  and  actions  (Thompson  1978  pp.  148-­149).  The  social  structure  is  treated  
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“independently  of   the  particular  contexts   in  which   [it   is]  produced,”  and,  as  such,  
these   “conceptual   schemes   and   theories   deal   not   with   society   but   with   reified  
abstractions”   (Maynard   &  Wilson   1980,   p.   306).   Racialized   social   structure   qua  
“reified   abstraction”   is   treated   as   the   ultimate   cause   of   racial   inequality,   not   the  
cumulative  actions  of  individuals.  As  Maynard  &  Wilson  put  it,  such  theories  “ignore  
the  fact  that  the  features  of  such  social  structures  are  produced  in  actual  interaction  
between  real  people  and  cannot  be  analyzed  as  though  they  existed  independently  
of  the  activities  that  produce  them”  (p.  308).    
Wilson’s   ([1987]  2012)  seminal  work  within   the  paradigm  has  been  widely  
critiqued   for   this  methodological   shortcoming,   especially   by  Massey   and  Denton  
(1993),   albeit   in   different   terms.  Wilson’s   thesis   is   centered   upon   the   colorblind  
operation   of   an   increasingly   deindustrializing   economy:  while   a   racial   division   of  
labor  was  established  through  historical   instances  of  explicitly   racist  practice,   the  
contemporary   exacerbation   of   racial   inequality   and   the   expansion   of   inner-­city  
anomy  can  be  traced  to  economic  trends  completely  unrelated  to  race  or  racism  (pp.  
11-­12).   Non-­whites   have   simply   been   disproportionately   negatively   affected   by  
automation,   loss   of   market-­share   for   American   manufacturers,   and   the  
transformation  of  factory  design/manufacturing  techniques  due  to  their  occupational  
concentration   in   manufacturing   (ibid.   pp.   38-­55).   These   trends   have   led   to  
disproportionately  high  unemployment  rates,  concomitant  surges  in  poverty  levels,  
and   the   rise   in   related   social   diseases   (e.g.,   crime,   welfare   dependence,   out   of  
wedlock  births,  drug  abuse,  etc.)  (ibid.  pp.  63-­84).  In  essence,  the  historical  artefact  
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of  racial  discrimination  was  subsequently  affected  by  non-­racial  dynamics,  resulting  
in   the   contemporary   iteration   of   racial   inequality.   A   social   structure   (economic  
adaption)  operated  according  to  its  own  internal  logic,  unaffected  by  human  action  
or  intention;;  racial  inequality  happened  to  be  the  accidental  consequence.  It  follows  
from  this  argument  that  non-­whites  do  not  resist  this  state  of  affairs,  and  whites  have  
no  role  in  its  perpetuation.  The  only  operative  cause  is  the  internal  logic  of  a  social  
structure.  All  other  social  actors  passively  accept  the  established  circumstances.    
Massey  &  Denton  (1993)  demonstrate  in  detail  that  racial  inequality  cannot  
be  considered  a  residue  or  artefact  of  the  blind  operation  of  social  structural  logic;;  
rather,   the   operation   of   social   structures   must   themselves   have   a   cause   in   the  
actions  and  intentions  of  individual  agents.  In  other  words,  they  argue  that  theories  
like  Wilson’s  that  “objectif[y]  social  structures  without  recognizing  that  only  human  
action   instantiates,   reproduces,   and   transforms   these   structures”   are  
methodologically  untenable  (see  Wendt  1987  p.  385  and  Abrams  1982  pp.  ix-­17  for  
a   fuller   discussion).   While   I   find   Massey   and   Denton’s   purported   cause   of   the  
continued  existence  of   racialized   social   structures   (i.e.,   “white   antipathy”)   largely  
unconvincing,  their  contribution  correctly  diagnoses  the  unsoundness  of  arguments  
predicated  on  structural  inertia  (p.  213).  It  must  be  acknowledged  that  when  faced  
with  social  structures,  individuals  act  (alone  or  in  concert  with  others)  in  ways  that  
reinforce  and  perpetuate  the  social  structures,  or  in  ways  that  alter  or  eliminate  the  
social  structures.  Recourse  to  passive  acceptance  of  their  operation  not  only  makes  
it  impossible  to  determine  the  initial  impetus  for  their  formation,  but  it  also  makes  it  
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impossible  to  determine  how  and  why  they  change  over  time.  Theories  that  rely  on  
structural   inertia  eliminate  anti-­structural  agency  (e.g.,   the  possibility  of  non-­white  
resistance),   and   the   potentiality   of   active  manipulation   of   the   operation   of   social  
structures  a  priori.    
While  Massey  &  Denton’s  critique  of  Wilson  has  shifted  the  paradigm  away  
from  wholescale   acceptance   of   his   thesis   (see  Charles   2003),   Sharkey’s   (2013)  
extremely  influential  and  much  more  recent  work—popularized  by  the  journalism  of  
Ta-­Nehisi   Coates   (see   especially   Coates   2014)—is   guilty   of   the   same  
methodological   flaws.  Like  Wilson,  Sharkey  acknowledges   the  historical   basis  of  
racial   inequality   in   explicit   racist   practice,   specifically   emphasizing   the   long-­term  
effects   of  New  Deal   housing   policies   on   the   de   facto   perpetuation   of   residential  
segregation  by  race  (pp.  21,  58-­62).  However,  the  continuity  and  exacerbation  of  
racial  segregation  over  time,  or,  as  his  subtitle  puts  it,  “the  end  of  progress  toward  
racial   equality,”   is   predicated   upon   the   passive   operation   of   social   structures.  
Sharkey  argues   that   “place”   is  perhaps   the  single  greatest  determining   factor   for  
one’s  life  chances:  Place  determines  the  quality  of  school  one  attends,  it  determines  
access   to   labor   markets   (which   determines   access   to   resources),   it   determines  
proximity   to  crime  and  violence,   it  determines   the   “quality”  of  one’s  peers,  and   it  
even  determines  one’s  parenting  style  (p.  116).  Sharkey  convincingly  argues  that  
the   cumulative   disadvantages   of   place   compound   intergenerationally:   a   child’s  
“inheritance   of   the   ghetto”   leads   to   extreme   levels   of   downward   socio-­economic  
mobility,   as   well   as   a   near   inability   to   translate   socio-­economic   gains   from   one  
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generation  to  the  next  (pp.  96,  105).  In  other  words,  the  racialized  social  structures  
of   residential   segregation   were   established   historically,   and   have   since   been  
passively   accepted   by   both   whites   and   non-­whites.   While   more   careful   in   his  
analysis   of   the   anti-­structural   movements   than   Wilson,   Sharkey   still   largely  
discounts  non-­white  agency,  while  largely  exonerating  white  pro-­structural  agency.  
Intergenerational   inheritance   of   spatial   disadvantage   certainly   compounds   racial  
inequality  over  time,  as  Sharkey’s  data  exhaustively  illustrate,  but  this  is  not  a  cause  
of  “the  end  of  progress  toward  racial  inequality.”  It  is  simply  how  a  racialized  social  
structure  operates:  a  racialized  social  structure  that  is  “instantiate[d],  reproduce[d],  
and  transform[ed]”  by  human  agency.    
While  some  accounts  within  the  paradigm  are  more  attuned  to—or,  at  least,  
aware   of—the   methodological   issues   associated   with   structural   reification,   the  
attempts   to   solve   the  problem  are   similarly   insufficient,   or,   at   best,   incomplete.   I  
focus  on  three  such  attempts.  The  first,  utilized  most  effectively  by  Sugrue  (2014),  
uses  structuration  theory  as  a  means  to  account  for  the  continuing  existence  and  
transformation  of   the  social  structures   that  are   responsible   for   the  persistence  of  
racial  inequality.  Structuration  theory  gives  “agents  and  structures  equal  ontological  
status,”  and  sees  “agents  and  structures  as  ‘co-­determined’  or  ‘mutually  constituted’  
entities”  (Wendt  1987,  p.  339).  As  Sugrue  (2014)  himself  puts  it,  “social  structures  
act  as  parameters   that   limit   the   range  of   individual  and  collective  decisions.  The  
consequences   of   hundreds   of   individual   acts   or   of   collective   activity,   however,  
gradually   strengthen,   redefine,   or   weaken   economic   and   social   structures.   The  
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relationship  between  structure  and  agency  is  dialectical  and  history  is  the  synthesis”  
(p.  11,  285  note  20).  While  structuration  theory  overcomes  the  reification  (or,  to  put  
it  more  colorfully,   fetishization)  of  social  structure   implicit   in   theories  of  structural  
racism—namely  by  giving  structure  a  perpetual  cause  in  the  continuing  actions  of  
individual  agents;;  themselves  a  function  of  existing  social  structure—it  does  so  at  
the  expense  of  the  capacity  to  make  generalizations  about  the  operation  of  society,  
and   is  generally  unable   to  account   for   the  dynamism  of  social  structures  without  
recourse   to   the   ill-­defined  vagaries  of   “historical  contingency.”  Because  history   is  
the  dialectical  “synthesis”  of  structure  and  agency,  both  are  often  conflated  “mak[ing]  
it  impossible  to  hold  them  apart,  in  the  kind  of  semi-­artificial  tension  that  is  needed  
to   explicate   the   terms   of   their   relations”   (Katznelson   1993   p.   88).  While   largely  
correct   in   its   insistence   upon   the   co-­determining   nature   of   social   structure   and  
individual  agency,  in  synthesizing  the  two  in  the  analysis  of  history,  theory—with  its  
explanatory   and   predictive   capacity   and   its   generalizability—is   sacrificed   in   the  
pursuit   nuance   and   detail.   While   this   is,   perhaps,   not   an   altogether   useless  
approach—especially   if  one’s  goal,   like  Sugrue’s,   is   to  provide  an  historical  case  
study—it  is  largely  unsatisfactory  in  accounting  for  the  secular  persistence  of  racial  
inequality,   the  marked   similarity   of   racial   structures   over   time  and  place,   and   its  
evolution,   which   has   tended   to   occur   cataclysmically,   rather   than   gradually   as  
structuration  theory  implies.      
	  	  
11  
Another  attempt  to  overcome  the  objectification  of  racialized  social  structures  
is   made   in   the   “neo-­Myrdalian”   work   of   George   Galster.3   Although   Galster’s  
cumulative  causation  thesis  concurs  with  structuration  theory  in  its  insistence  upon  
the   co-­determination  of   structure  and  agency,   unlike   structuration   theory  Galster  
avoids  conflating  the  two,  while,  critically,  providing  a  theoretical  explanation  for  the  
persistence  of  racialized  social  structures  through  the  actions  of  individual  agents.  
In   other   words,   whereas   structuration   theory   does   not   provide   a   generalizable  
rationale  for  agents’  actions  in  their  role  as  perpetuators  of  social  structure  (i.e.,  it  is  
not   a   theory   at   all;;   see  Waltz   2010   pp.   1-­17   for   a   useful   discussion),   Galster’s  
cumulative   causation   thesis   does.   Galster   argues   that   racial   inequality   is   self-­
reinforcing:   racialized   social   structures   produce   racialized   outcomes;;   racialized  
outcomes   “legitimize   stereotypical   images”;;   stereotypical   images   intensify   racial  
discrimination   and   prejudice;;   racial   discrimination   and   prejudice   produce   and  
sustain  racialized  social  structures,  ad  infinitum  (Galster  1992,  pp.  192,  201;;  Galster  
1988,  p.  402).  While  “white  antipathy,”  as  Massey  &  Denton  (1993,  p.  213)  put  it,  is  
ultimately  responsible  for  the  persistence  of  racial  inequality,  racism  is  not  treated  
as  a  free-­floating  phenomenon,  disconnected  and  exogenous  from  the  operation  of  
racialized   social   structures   themselves4   (Galster   1988,   pp.   395-­396).   Rather,  
                                                
3  While  the  “neo-­Myrdalian”  cumulative  causation  thesis  is  present  in  much  of  
Galster’s  work  (see,  for  instance,  Galster  &  Godfrey  2005,  p.  261),  its  theoretical  
foundations  are  most  fully  elaborated  in  Galster  1988  and  Galster  1992.  
4  This  is  how  racism—defined  as  an  ideology  of  racial  superiority  that  may  or  may  
not  manifest  itself  as  overt  discrimination  and/or  prejudice  along  racial  lines—is  
often  treated  both  academically  and  popularly.  Massey  &  Denton  (1993)  are  
especially  culpable  in  this  regard  (although  they  do  report  Galster’s  claims  in  
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Galster  claims,  racial  prejudice  is  simply  a  rational  reaction  by  whites  to  the  genuine  
social  pathologies  of  the  black  underclass;;  pathologies  that  are  ultimately  the  result  
of  racialized  social  structures.  Racial  prejudice  is,  in  a  sense,  justified,  because  the  
“reality   on   which   such   stereotypes   and   opinions   are   based   remains   essentially  
correct”  (Galster  1992,  p.  203).  Since  the  stereotypes  of  blacks  that  whites  tend  to  
hold  are  “essentially  correct,”  whites  rationally  act  in  ways  that  fortify  and  perpetuate  
racialized  social  structures  (e.g.,  labor  market  discrimination  against  blacks  is  wholly  
explicable  if  blacks  are,  in  reality,  a  “potent  combination  of  criminal  record,  unstable  
job  history,  illegitimacy,  low  educational  attainment,  poor  work  habits,  and  chemical  
dependencies”   (ibid.  p.  201)).  Racialized  social   structures  are  caused  by  whites’  
prejudices;;   whites’   prejudices   are   confirmed   and   justified   by   the   operation   of  
racialized  social  structures:  racial  inequality  is  perpetuated  because  whites  have  a  
reason  to  perpetuate  it.  
Again,  like  structuration  theory,  Galster’s  cumulative  causation  thesis  avoids  
the  reification  of  social  structure  by  giving  individual  agents  an  impetus  to  perpetuate  
the   social   structures   that   cause   racial   inequality.   Unlike   structuration   theory,  
however,  this  impetus  (i.e.,  “attitudinal  reinforcement”  of  racial  prejudice  through  the  
operation   of   racialized   social   structures)   is   explicable   theoretically,   and  
                                                
passing;;  p.  109).  While,  according  to  Charles  (2003),  Massey  &  Denton  were  
largely  responsible  for  reintroducing  racial  discrimination  as  an  operative  variable  
in  the  perpetuation  of  racial  inequality  (specifically  as  a  rejoinder  to  Wilson  (  [1987]  
2012)),  they  did  so  largely  without  grounding  it  in  existing  social  relations.  “White  
antipathy”  may  be  the  ultimate  cause  of  racial  inequality,  but  this  leaves  the  origin  
of  white  antipathy  entirely  unexplained.  The  same  is  true  for  the  now  fashionable  
study  of  implicit  bias  (Quillian  2006).    
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generalizable  over  time  and  place.  However,  Galster’s  claims  are  not  without  their  
serious  faults.  Beyond  the  seemingly  obvious  apologism  for  the  racism  of  whites,  
his  “cumulative  causation”  thesis  largely  ignores  the  agency  of  blacks,  is  unable—
because  it  conceptualizes  the  perpetuation  of  racial  inequality  as  a  closed  system  
(“an  ever-­worsening  self-­reinforcing   ‘vicious  cycle’”   (ibid.  p.  200))—to  account   for  
the  transformation  of  racial   inequality  over   time,5  and,  most   importantly,   it  cannot  
explain  the  varied  and  relatively  widespread  incidence  of  whites  overcoming  racial  
prejudice  to  pursue  common  goals  with  blacks  and  other  non-­whites  (or,  at  the  very  
least,  is  unable  to  explain  why  regimes  of  racial  inequality  are  re-­implemented  when  
successfully  challenged  by   interracial  economic  and  social  movements).   In  other  
words,  if  attitudinal  reinforcement  is  the  causal  driver  of  the  perpetuation  of  racial  
                                                
5  Galster  does  allow  for  exogenous  shocks  to  affect  the  otherwise  endogenous  
linkages  of  the  cumulative  causation  model  (Galster  1992,  p.  200).  However,  these  
exogenous  shocks  (e.g.,  “macroeconomic  conditions,  technologies,  political  
ideologies,  religious  beliefs,  laws,  and  public  policies”  (ibid.))  are  left  largely  
unexplored;;  specifically,  the  exogenous  nature  of  these  factors  is  left  completely  
unchallenged.  It  is  not  altogether  obvious  that  evolving  political  ideologies,  
religious  beliefs,  laws,  and  public  policies  should  be  treated  as  originating  
separately  from  the  social  structures  that  perpetuate  racial  inequality.  Indeed,  even  
the  implementation  of  technologies  has  historically  effected  non-­whites  and  whites  
unequally,  often  at  the  behest  of  racial  animus.  For  instance,  black  coal  miners  
were  largely  driven  out  of  the  industry  by  the  discriminatory  implementation  of  
industrial  mechanization,  and  were  left  unprotected  by  the  largely  white  leadership  
of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America  who  did  “not  believe[]  that  it  had  a  
responsibility  to  fight  the  many  racially  discriminatory  policies  of  the  companies”  
(Goldfield  1993,  pp.  9-­10).  In  the  auto  industry,  higher  productivity  in  majority  white  
plants  was  achieved  largely  through  automation,  while  in  majority  black  plants,  like  
Chrysler’s  Eldon  Avenue  Gear  and  Axle  plant  in  Detroit,  higher  productivity  was  
achieved  through  so-­called  “Niggermation,”  or  forcing  black  workers  to  “work  
harder  and  faster  under  increasingly  unsafe  and  unhealthy  conditions”  (Georgakas  
&  Surkin  2012,  pp.  85-­106).    
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inequality,  the  cumulative  causation  thesis  is  unable  to  explain  why,  in  the  absence  
discriminatory   attitudes   driving   individual   action,   laws,   public   policies,   and   social  
practices  are  re-­imposed  that  are  meant  to  perpetuate  racial  inequality.  While  I  will  
discuss   this   in   more   detail   in   Section   4,   some   cursory   remarks   are   perhaps  
appropriate.    
As  Goldfield   (1993)  has  argued  persuasively,  and  dozens  of   case  studies  
have   confirmed   (see,   for   example,   Horowitz   1997),   successful   unionization   of  
interracial  workforces  requires  the  organization  of  all  workers,  regardless  of  race,  
and   must   have   “at   least   an   initial   [racially]   equalitarian   stance”   (p.   23).   As   the  
following   quote—by   a   white   steelworker   from   Birmingham—suggests,   racial  
prejudice  can  be  overcome  if  it  conflicts  with  more  pressing  interests:  “We  got  to  get  
together  and  organize  the  niggahs  and  whites  into  one  strong  general  union”  (Kelley  
2015,  p.  28).  Kelley  (2015)  notes,  too,  that  several  former  KKK  members  joined  the  
vehemently  anti-­racist,  and,  in  Alabama,  largely  African  American,  Communist  Party  
USA   in   the   1930s,   as   the   racial   prejudice   of   these   “Klansmen   gone   Red”   was  
outweighed  by   their  common  cause  with  black  sharecroppers  and  workers   (ibid.;;  
see   too  Regensburger   1987   pp.   162-­169;;  Gilmore   2008   pp.   86-­92).   In   both   the  
relatively  mundane  circumstances  of  unionizing  interracial  workforces,  and  the  more  
atypical  instances  of  largescale  interracial  social  movements,  white  antipathy  is,  at  
least  temporarily,  allayed,  while  the  social  structures  that  are  responsible  for  racial  
inequality   are   effectively   challenged.   What   needs   to   be   explained   is   why   new  
racialized   social   structures   emerge   from   the   rubble   of   interracial   economic   and  
	  	  
15  
social  movements.  If  the  “endogenous  linkages”  of  cumulative  causation  are  broken,  
how  and  why  are  they  reestablished?    
A  third  attempt  to  overcome  the  objectification  of  racialized  social  structures  
offers  a  plausible,  albeit  incomplete,  answer  to  the  latter  question.  Eduardo  Bonilla-­
Silva  (2014)  argues  that  racialized  social  structures  “remain  in  place  for  the  same  
reason   that  other   structures  do”:  Social   structures   remain   in  place  because   they  
benefit  dominate  members  of  the  society  (p.  9).  As  Gilpin  (1999)  put  it:  “Actors  enter  
social  relations  and  create  social  structures  in  order  to  advance  particular  sets  of  
political,  economic,  or  other  types  of   interests…[A]lthough  social  systems  impose  
restraints  on  the  behavior  of  all  actors,  the  behavior  rewarded  and  punished  by  the  
system   will   coincide,   at   least   initially,   with   the   interests   of   the   most   powerful  
members  of  the  social  system”  (p.  9).  Racialized  social  structures  are  no  exception:  
“Since  actors  racialized  as  ‘white’—or  as  members  of  the  dominant  race—receive  
material   benefits   from   the   racial   order,   they   struggle…to   maintain   their  
privileges…Therein  lies  the  secret  of  racial  structures  and  racial  inequality  the  world  
over.  They  exist  because  they  benefit  members  of  the  dominate  race”  (Bonilla-­Silva  
2014,  p.  9).    
While   this   “secret”   may   appear   obvious   at   first   blush,   it   is   conspicuously  
absent   from   the   seminal   accounts  within   the   structural   racism   paradigm.  Wilson  
(2012)   and   Sharkey   (2013)   rely   primarily   upon   structural   inertia   and   the   self-­
perpetuation  of  racial  inequality;;  Massey  &  Denton  (1993)  rely  upon  a  free-­floating  
and  exogenous  version  of  “white  antipathy”  to  account  for  the  persistence  of  racial  
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inequality;;  6  and  Galster  (1988  &  1992)  provides  justification  for  this  “white  antipathy”  
in  the  social  pathologies  of  the  black  underclass.  Racial   inequality   is  perpetuated  
because   agents   passively   abide   by   the   dictates   of   social   structure,   or   because  
whites   rationally   (Galster)   or   irrationally   (Massey   &   Denton)   abhor   blacks.   The  
social,  material,  and  psychological  advantages  that  whites  accrue  relative  to  blacks  
are  not  considered  operative  in  the  perpetuation  of  racial  inequality,  and  are  often  
mentioned  only  incidentally.  However,  treating  the  perpetuation  of  racial  inequality  
as  a  function  of  the  interests  of  the  dominant  race  (i.e.,  whites)  overcomes  both  the  
objectification   of   social   structure   (racialized   social   structures   are   perpetuated  
because  whites  have  an  interest  in  their  perpetuation),  and  the  causal  reliance  upon  
white  antipathy  which  is  itself  not  given  a  cause  (see  supra  note  4).  Like  Galster’s  
cumulative  causation  thesis,  though,  it  is  unable  to  account  for  the  dynamics  of  racial  
inequality   (namely   the   various   bouts   of   interracial   solidarity),   and,   more  
problematically,  assumes  that  the  benefits  of  racial  inequality  accrue  equally  and  in  
similar  ways  to  all  members  of  the  dominant  race.  While  racial  inequality  may  benefit  
all  whites   relative   to  non-­whites,   it   does  not  benefit   all  whites  absolutely.  This   is  
especially  the  case  for  white  workers,  whose  wages,  for  instance,  are  pulled  down  
when   competing   in   the   same   labor   market   with   non-­whites   whose   wages   are  
artificially  deflated  by  discriminatory  wage  policies—hence  the  persistence  of  lower  
                                                
6  In  an  especially  perceptive  review,  Asad  Haider  likens  the  treatment  of  racism  in  
this  vein  to  magic:  it  is  construed  as  a  “malevolent  force”  that  “has  no  history;;”  it  is  
a  “moralizing  discourse  which  monopolizes  the  discussion  of  race,  yet  fails  to  
propose  either  a  coherent  theory  of  racial  oppression  or  a  viable  program  for  
eliminating  it”  (Haider  2017).    
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wages  in  the  South  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  US  (Roemer  1979;;  Katznelson  2013  
pp.   241-­242).   Indeed,   contrary   to   prevailing   perceptions,   even   slaves—at   least  
19.3%   of   which   in   1860   would   have   been   classified   as   semi-­skilled   or   skilled  
artisans—competed  extensively  against  poor  whites,  displacing  them  and  lowering  
wages   in   agriculture,   mining,   factory   work,   longshore,   canal   digging,   and   the  
majority   of   skilled   labor   occupations   in   large   southern   cities   (Starobin   1975;;  
Goldfield  1997,  p.  107;;  Post  2012,  p.  126;;).  While  white  workers  certainly  benefited  
from  slavery   relative   to  black  slaves  and   freedmen  and  women,   this  was  not   the  
case  absolutely,  as  “abolition  was  surely  in  the  immediate  interests  of  poor  southern  
whites,  whose  best  chance  to  live  well  was  in  the  freeing  and  subsequent  raising  of  
the  living  standards  of  their  slave  competitors”  (Goldfield  1997,  p.  107).  The  same  
can  be  said  for  more  contemporary  iterations  of  racialized  wage  scales.    
In   sum,   theories   of   structural   racism   are   largely   unable   to   explain   the  
persistence  and  evolution  of  racial   inequality   in  the  US.  Seminal  works  within  the  
paradigm,  like  Wilson  ([1987]  2012)  and  Sharkey  (2013)  reify  the  social  structures  
that  they  argue  are  responsible  for  the  perpetuation  of  racial  inequality,  untenably  
relying  upon  the  self-­perpetuation  of  racialized  social  structures  in  the  absence  of  
an  actual  causal  mechanism  grounded  in  the  actions  of  real  individuals  in  society;;  
Massey  &  Denton  (1993)  and  Galster  (1988  &  1992)  avoid  this  structural  reification  
by  relying  upon  differing  notions  of  white  racism  for  the  perpetuation  of  racialized  
social  structures,  but  are  still  unable  to  account  for  the  dynamism  of  racial  inequality  
and   the  extremely  consequential   instances  of   interracial  solidarity   that  effectively  
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challenge  the  racial  status  quo.  Bonilla-­Silva  (2014)  brings  us  closer  to  a  plausible  
explanation   for   the  persistence  of   racial   inequality  by  grounding   racialized  social  
structures  causally  in  the  interests  of  members  of  the  dominant  race  (whites),  but  
problematically  assumes   that   the  benefits  of   racial   inequality  accrue  equally  and  
similarly  to  all  members  of  the  dominant  race.  None  of  this   is  to  say  that  each  of  
these   accounts   of   the   perpetuation   of   racial   inequality   are   totally   without   merit.  
Indeed,  while  failing  to  explain  why  racial  inequality  has  persisted  over  time,  each  
work   adroitly   describes   the   mechanisms   through   which   racial   inequality   has  
persisted—at  least  since  the  early  20th  century.  In  other  words,  theories  of  structural  
racism   have   been   adept   at   explaining  how   racial   inequality   has   persisted,  while  








                                                
7  Theodore  Allen  (2012)  conceptualizes  this  issue  similarly  when  he  states  his  
focus  as  “primarily  not  on  why  the  bourgeoisie  in  continental  Anglo-­America  had  
recourse  to  that  anachronistic  form  of  labor,  slavery,  but  rather  on  how  they  could  
establish  and  maintain  for  such  a  long  historical  period  that  degree  of  social  
control  without  which  no  motive  of  profit  or  prejudice  could  have  effect”  (Vol.  1,  p.  
1,  emphasis  in  original).    
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SECTION  2:  THEORETICAL  FRAME  
I  attempt  to  remedy  this  by  locating  the  causal   impetus  of  racialized  social  
structures  in  the  class  relations  of  the  US.  While,  as  I  will  argue,  racial  inequality  is  
grounded   in   class   relations,   it   is   not   reducible   to   them.  Bonilla-­Silva   (1997)   and  
others  have  critiqued  class-­based  explanations  of  racial  inequality  on  the  grounds  
that  race/racism  is  treated  in  an  “idealist  fashion[;;]  Racism,  in  [these]  accounts,  is  
an  ideology  that  emerged  with  chattel  slavery  and  other  forms  of  class  oppression  
to  justify  the  exploitation  of  people  of  color  and  survives  as  a  residue  of  the  past”  
(pp.  466-­467).  Subsequent  class-­based  accounts,  while  grounding   race   in  social  
relations,  “do  so  by  ultimately  subordinating  racial  matters  to  class  matters”  (p.  467).  
If   we   take   Bonilla-­Silva’s   critique   at   its   word,   a   class-­based   account   of   racial  
inequality  must  (1)  be  grounded  in  social  relations  and  not   idealism,  (2)  must  not  
treat   race   as   a   “residue   of   the   past,”   but   as   a   continually   socially   operative  
phenomenon,  and  (3)  must  not  reduce  racial  matters  to  class  matters.  While  Bonilla-­
Silva  largely  assumes  that  any  account  of  racial  phenomenon  that  does  one  of  these  
things  is  incorrect—besides  tacit  allusion  to  reductionism,  no  explanation  is  given  
as  to  why  parameter  (3)  is  automatically  wrong—I  believe  these  parameters  provide  
a  useful  guideline  for  constructing  any  theory  of  racial  inequality.    
Racism,   taken   as   an   ideological   phenomenon,   does   little   to   explain   the  
persistence   of   racial   inequality,   especially   when   analyzing   post-­Jim   Crow   race  
relations  (see  ibid.  pp.  467-­469  for  a  more  in-­depth  discussion).  As  a  result,  some  
scholars,   like   Ignatiev   (1995),   “consider   the   term   [‘racism’]   useless”   (p.   178).  
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However,  Ignatiev’s  consideration  goes  too  far,  while  not  going  far  enough.  While  
survey  data  purporting  to  measure  racism  can  be  useful  in  explaining  some  socio-­
political   phenomenon—such   as   Kuziemko   &   Washington’s   (2015)   study   of   the  
South’s   1963   shift   from  Democratic   Party   bastion   to   Republican   Party  mainstay  
using   proxy   data   for   racial   ideology—popular   and   scholarly   accounts   that  
overemphasize  ideological  racism  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  factors  leads  one  to  
the  conclusion  that  racism,  as  an  element   in  the  perpetuation  of  racial   inequality,  
may  actually  be  worse  than  useless,  serving  to  distort  the  actual  causal  mechanisms  
involved.   The   theory   presented   in   what   follows,   then,   while   treating   racism  
ideologically—primarily   as   a   doctrine   of   justification—places   little,   if   any,   causal  
emphasis  upon  racism  as  an  ideology.  Since  race/racial  inequality  is  a  continually  
operative  social  phenomenon,  it  will  also  not  be  treated  as  a  “residue  of  the  past,”  
but  as  a  dynamic  and  extremely  adaptable  element  of  historic  and  contemporary  
social  relations.  Additionally,  racial  oppression  will  not  be  subordinated  or  reduced  
to   “class  matters,”   insofar  as  class-­based   theories  of   racial   inequality  actually  do  
this.  Indeed,  while  the  allegation  of  reductionism  is  a  fairly  common  methodological  
rebuttal,  Bonilla-­Silva’s  critique  seems  to  treat  class  not  as  an  objective  relationship  
to  the  means  of  production—as  the  theories  he  critiques  do,  namely  Cox  (1959)—
but  as  an  informal  grouping  of  individuals  based  on  their  income,  in  the  manner  of  
the   more   colloquial   usage   of   the   word.   Put   another   way,   such   critiques   rarely  
address  class-­based   theories  of   racial   inequality  on   their  own  ground,  hence   the  
heretofore  lack  of  overlap  in  the  largely  class-­based  white  supremacy  literature  (e.g.,  
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Morgan  2003;;  Allen  2012;;  Fredrickson  1982;;  Cell  1985;;  Goldfield  1997),  and   the  
largely  class-­dismissive  structural  racism  literature  surveyed  above.  Critics  of  class-­
based  theories  of  racial  inequality  also  seem  to  imply,  more  or  less  overtly,  that  such  
theories   make   the   case   that   class   oppressions   are   somehow   more   “real”   or  
“objective”   than   race-­based   oppressions;;   that   the   elimination   of   class-­based  
oppression  will   automatically   entail   the  elimination  of   race-­based  oppression,   or,  
alternatively,  that  as  blacks  improve  their  class  position,  racial  oppression  is  allayed  
or  eliminated  (see  Roediger  2007,  pp.  6-­11  for  an  overview).  Each  of  these  claims  
are,  of  course,  false,  and,  to  the  extent  that  class-­based  theories  of  racial  inequality  
make  similar  claims,   they  must  be  rejected  (although  most  do  not)8.  Race-­based  
oppressions  are  very  real,  a  classless  society  is  not  necessarily  a  raceless  society,  
and   non-­whites   suffer   from   racial   oppression   regardless   of   their   class   position  
(however  defined).9    
Consistent  with  these  critiques,  the  theory  presented  in  what  follows  will  avoid  
the   fallacies   of   other   class-­based   theories   of   racial   inequality,   adhering   to   the  
                                                
8  There  are,  of  course,  examples  of  political  activism  predicated  upon  class-­based  
analyses  of  social  relations  that  rejected  the  primacy,  or  even  the  existence,  of  
distinctly  racial  oppression  as  opposed  to  class  oppression.  Leaders  of  the  
Socialist  Party  of  America  (SP),  for  instance,  if  not  outspoken  racists  like  Victor  
Berger  and  his  followers,  were  at  best  apathetic  when  it  came  to  race.  As  
perennial  SP  presidential  candidate  Eugene  V.  Debs  put  it  in  1903,  “We  have  
nothing  special  to  offer  the  Negro,  and  we  cannot  make  separate  appeals  to  all  the  
races”  (Debs  1903;;  see,  too,  Green  1980).  Nevertheless,  party  lines  ought  not  to  
serve  as  strawmen  for  developed  theories.    
9  While  countless  empirical  studies  have  confirmed  this  latter  point,  the  recent  
violent  arrest  of  multimillionaire  NFL  lineman  Michael  Bennett,  guilty  of  “simply  
being  a  black  man  in  the  wrong  place  at  the  wrong  time,”  provides  a  vivid  
illustration  (Stahl  2017).    
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following   empirical   constraints:   (1)   racial   inequality   must   be   grounded   in   social  
relations,  not  ideology,  (2)  the  causes  and  effects  of  racial  inequality  must  be  treated  
as  a  continually  operative  social  phenomenon,   (3)   racial  oppression  must  not  be  
reduced  to  class  oppression,  (4)  racial  oppression  must  be  considered  just  as  “real”  
as  class  oppression,  (5)  it  must  not  be  assumed  that  the  end  of  class  is  also  the  end  
of  race,  and  (6)  racial  oppression  must  be  treated  as  a  phenomenon  that  affects  all  
non-­whites,  regardless  of  class  position.  Class  is  treated  as  an  objective  relationship  
to  the  means  of  production,  not  as  hierarchy  of  income  scales:  the  working  class  is  
defined   as   encompassing   all   those   who   sell   their   capacity   to   labor   for   wages;;  
capitalists  are  defined  as   those  who  own   the  means  of  production  and  generate  
profit  through  the  exploitation  of  their  employees  (see  Hyman  1975).  While  this  is  a  
radical  simplification,  I  concur  with  Wright  (2000)  when  he  says  that  “this  abstract,  
polarized  description  of  class  relations  in  capitalism  can  still  be  useful  in  clarifying  
real  mechanisms  that  actual  actors  face  and  is  thus  a  useful  point  of  departure”  (p.  
961).   Other   distinct   class   positions   can   be   easily   assimilated   to   such   a  
conceptualization  of  class  relations,  (e.g.,  the  “petite  bourgeoisie,”  or  small-­business  
owners,   share   many   of   the   same   interests   of   large-­scale   capitalists,   as   do   the  
“middle  class”  of  non-­capital  owning  managers  (Wright  1997)),  or  can  be  considered  
as  being  occupied  by  former  and/or  potential  members  of  these  classes  (e.g.,  the  
“lumpenproletariat”  or  the  “underclass”).10    
                                                
10  Much  has  been  read  into  the  independent  and  progressive  political  potential  of  
this  latter  group,  especially  those  activists  and  writers  influenced  by  the  work  of  
Frantz  Fanon.  However,  emphasis  on  the  lumpenproletariat—especially  in  the  
	  	  
23  
These  two  major  classes—capitalists  and  the  working  class—have  inherently  
contradictory11  material  interests,  and  it  is  assumed  that  each  class  pursues  these  
material   interests12   through  whatever  means  at   its  disposal.  Thus,  class  relations  
are  typified  as  being  an  “unceasing  power  struggle”  (Hyman  1975,  p.  26,  emphasis  
in   original).   Workers   can   pursue   their   material   interests   individually   (through  
mobility),   or   collectively,   through   what   Wright   (2000)   has   characterized   as  
“associational  power,”  or  “the  various  forms  of  power  that  result  from  the  formation  
of  collective  organizations  of  workers”  (p.  962).  Of  course,  workers  rarely,  if  ever,  
unite  as  an  entire  class,  but  often  do  so  through  smaller  collective  organizations  that  
represent   workers   in   a   particular   occupation   or   industry   (i.e.,   unions),   or   that  
represent   workers   of   a   particular   subset   of   the   working   class   (i.e.,   race,   ethnic,  
and/or  gender  exclusive  organizations)  (see  Brenner  &  Brenner  1981).  Capitalists  
can  also  pursue  their  material  interests  individually  (again,  through  mobility,  but  also  
through  intimidation/outright  violence,  and  mechanization),  and  collectively  through  
                                                
case  of  the  US—is  borne  out  of  either  a  misreading  of  Fanon’s  work  (which  
explicitly  addressed  the  colonial  situation,  necessitating  that  class  analysis  be  
“slightly  stretched”  (Fanon  [1961]  2004,  p.  5),  or  a  conflation  of  colonial  oppression  
with  racial  oppression  (See  Allen  2012,  Vol.  1  pp.  69-­70,  81-­82).  The  formation  of  
the  Detroit  branch  of  the  Black  Panther  Party  by  the  League  of  Revolutionary  
Black  Workers  was,  at  least  partially,  an  attempt  to  rectify  these  theoretical  
fallacies  present  in  radical  African-­American  political  activism  (Geschwender  1979,  
pp.  140-­142).    
11  A  social  phenomenon  is  “contradictory”  when  “there  are  multiple  conditions  for  
the  reproduction  of  a  system  which  cannot  all  be  simultaneously  satisfied”  (Wright  
1995,  p.  18).  Profits  cannot  be  maximized  if  wages  are  also  maximized.      
12  It  must  be  emphasized  that  these  interests  are  neither  eternal  (i.e.,  ahistorical)  
or  somehow  attributable  to  “human  nature,”  but  are  economic  imperatives  unique  
to  the  social  property  relations  of  capitalism  as  it  has  developed  historically.  See  
Brenner  2007,  pp.  57-­59.    
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collusion   (e.g.,   wage-­setting,   mergers,   etc.)   and   combination   (e.g.,   the   National  
Association  of  Manufacturers,  countless  chambers  of  commerce,  etc.)   (Schwartz  
1987).  Most  importantly,  both  classes  can  vie  for  the  support  of  the  state  through  
political  parties,  lobbying,  financing  of  election  campaigns,  etc.  As  will  be  discussed  
in  detail,  though,  the  interests  of  capitalists  are  heavily  favored  by  the  state,  due  to  
its  unique  structural  position  in  a  capitalist  economy  (Block  1977).    
However,  while  the  “unceasing  power  struggle”  of  class  conflict  may,  at  times,  
be   violent,   coercive,   and   unrestrained,   class   relations   are   often  maintained   and  
perpetuated  through  a  series  of  concessions  given  by  each  opposing  class  to  the  
other.  These  “class  compromises”  allay  class  conflict,  providing  “material  bases  of  
consent”  for  the  newly  established  terrain  of  class  relations  (Wright  2000,  p.  964).  
Crucially,  in  this  formulation,  each  class  has  a  genuine,  material  rationale  for  abiding  
by  the  dictates  of  the  class  compromise—they  are  not  “mystified”  by  an  ideological  
superstructure  to  act  in  ways  antithetical  to  their  own  interests,  as  orthodox  Marxists  
have  contended.13  Rather,  each  class  has  a  vested  interest  in  the  perpetuation  of  
the   class   compromise.  Nevertheless,   not   all   class   compromises   are   alike:   some  
generate   strong   incentives   for   their   perpetuation,   while   others   are   unstable   and  
quickly  altered.  Wright   (2000)  provides  a  useful   typology:  a  class  compromise   is  
“negative”  if  it  is  initiated  to  avoid  “mutual  damage”  to  either  side—concessions  are  
given   by   both   classes   (even   extremely   asymmetrical   concessions)   to   prevent  
                                                
13  See  Wood  2016,  pp.  19-­75  for  a  useful  discussion  of  base  and  superstructure  in  
Marxian  thought.    
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presumed  bilateral  losses  (pp.  957-­958).  A  negative  class  compromise  is,  by  its  very  
nature,  unstable,  as  it  “represents  a  compromise  unsatisfactory  to  both  parties”—
while   both   sides   benefit   relative   to   a   situation   not   characterized   by   a   class  
compromise  (hence  they  are  incentivized  to  perpetuate  it),  each  side  still  concedes  
particular   interests   that   it  would  prefer  not   to,  given   ideal  circumstances   (Hyman  
1975,  p.  27,  emphasis   in  original).  Thus,   the  contours  and   terms  of   the  negative  
class  compromise  will  shift  along  with  the  balance  of  class  forces,  or,  in  other  words,  
“whenever  either  side  feels  that  circumstances  are  in  its  favor”  (ibid.).  A  “positive”  
class  compromise,  on   the  other  hand,   is  a   “form  of  mutual   cooperation  between  
opposing  classes”  in  which  “both  parties  can  improve  their  position”  simultaneously  
(Wright  2000,  p.  958).  Since  both  sides  actively  benefit  from  cooperation,  a  positive  
class   compromise   is   relatively   stable,   as   it   provides   strong   incentives   for   both  
classes  to  perpetuate  its  terms.    
Wright   (2000)   primarily   uses   the   concept   of   a   positive   class   compromise  
normatively;;  he  attempts  to  locate  an  ideal  ratio  between  the  associational  power  of  
the  working  class  and  the  realization  of  the  material  interests  of  capitalists,  wherein  
the  interests  of  both  are  maximized.  Whereas  the  inherently  unstable  negative  class  
compromise  represents  a  zero-­sum  game  between  capital  and  the  working  class,  
Wright   posits   the   “possibility   of   a   non-­zero-­sum   game”   (p.   958).  He   argues   that  
“once   working-­class   power   crosses   some   threshold,   [it]   begins   to   have   positive  
effects  on  capitalists’   interests”   (ibid.  p.  959).  Specifically,  when   this   threshold   is  
reached,  it  “allow[s]  for  significant  gains  in  productivity  and  rates  of  profit  due  to  such  
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things   as   high   levels   of   bargained   cooperation   between  workers   and   capitalists,  
rationalized   systems   of   skill   upgrading   and   job   training,   enhanced   capacity   for  
solving  macroeconomic  problems,  and  a  greater  willingness  of  workers  to  accept  
technological  change  given  the  relative  job  security  they  achieve  because  of  union  
protections”   (ibid.   p.   960).   In   essence,   strong   unions   and   other   forms   of   worker  
organization   can,   under   certain   circumstances,   solve   collective   action   problems  
capitalists  face  that,  otherwise,  they  would  have  no  way  of  solving.    
This  relationship  is  illustrated  conceptually  in  Figure  1.  The  x-­axis  represents  
the  associational  power  of  the  working  class,  with  associational  power  increasing  
from  left   to  right.  The  y-­axis  represents  the  realization  of   the  material   interests  of  
capitalists,  increasing  from  bottom  to  top.  From  the  first,  far-­left  peak  of  the  graphed  
line  to  the  first  trough,  the  inverse  relationship  between  the  associational  power  of  
the   working   class   and   the   realization   of   the   material   interests   of   capitalists   is  
depicted.  As  the  associational  power  of  the  working  class  increases,  the  realization  
of   the  material   interests   of   capitalists   decreases.  At   the   first   trough,   though,   the  
“threshold”  of  associational  power  is  reached,  allowing  for  the  non-­zero-­sum  game  
of  the  positive  class  compromise  to  commence,  reversing  this  inverse  relationship.  
The   second,   far-­right   peak   represents   the   optimal   cooperation   between   both  
classes,  what  Wright  calls  a  “social-­democratic  utopia.”  After  this  point,  the  inverse  



















As  a  normative  exercise,  Wright’s  formulation  of  a  positive  class  compromise  
provides  an  empirical  rationale  for  the  benefits  of  social  democracy.  Descriptively,  
the  model  also  suggests   that   the  differences   in  class  relations  between  relatively  
stable  social  democracies  (e.g.,  the  Scandinavian  countries)  and  less  stable  non-­
social   democracies   is   due   to   the   presence   (or   lack   thereof)   of   a   positive   class  
compromise  between  capitalists  and  the  working  class  (pp.  992-­995).  However,  if  
we  move  from  this  highly  abstract  level  of  analysis  to  the  more  concrete  instances  
of   actual   class   formation,   the   notion   of   a   positive   class   compromise   becomes  
Source:  Wright  2000,  p.  987  
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extremely   useful   as   a   conceptual   model   in   explaining   the   persistence   of   racial  
inequality   in   the  US   (see  Wright   1997   pp.   8-­16   for   a   discussion   of   the   levels   of  
abstraction  in  class  analysis).  Such  a  model  would  take  into  account  how  the  US  
working  class  has  actually  organized  to  pursue  its   interests  (both  inclusively  as  a  
class-­based  movement,  and  exclusively  in  its  race  and  gender-­based  iterations),  it  
would  take  into  account  the  extremely  consequential  role  of  the  state,  and  it  would  
be   able   to   explain   theoretically   the   historical   dynamism   and   evolution   of   white  
supremacy  over  time.    
In  constructing  this  model,  I  rely  on  the  work  of  Piven  &  Cloward  ([1971]  1993)  
and  Goldfield  (1989).  Both  works  attempt  to  establish  causal  links  between  broad  
social   movements   and   relief   policies   (e.g.,   social   welfare,   ostensibly   pro-­labor  
legislation,  etc.)  which  are  “designed  to  mute  civil  disorder”  (Piven  &  Cloward  1993,  
p.  xv).   In   this   formulation,   the  state  serves  as  a  conciliatory  mechanism  between  
capitalists  and   the  working   class:   the   state   initiates  pro-­working   class  policies   to  
assuage  social  unrest  triggered  by  class  antagonisms  (Goldfield  1989,  p.  1265).  The  
working  class  benefits—at   least   in   the  short-­term—from   the  conciliatory  policies,  
and  capitalists  benefit—in  the  short  and  long  term—from  the  muting  of  civil  disorder  
and  the  re-­establishment  of  the  social  control  necessary  for  the  perpetuation  of  a  
capitalist   economy.   Subsequently,   as   social   unrest   subsides,   the   conciliatory  
policies  are  contracted  or  eliminated,  which  eventually  culminate  in  another  wave  of  
social  unrest  and  a  new  set  of  conciliatory  polices  (Piven  &  Cloward  1993.  pp.  45,  
123-­145).  In  sum,  there  is  a  cyclical  pattern  between  “long  periods  of  restrictiveness  
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[that]  are  interrupted  periodically  by  short  periods  of  liberalization,”  predicated  upon  
the  level  of  working  class  militancy  (ibid.  p.  35).  While  Piven  &  Cloward  emphasize  
the  effectiveness  of  “spontaneous,  unorganized,  [and]  disruptive  threats  of  the  poor  
and  underrepresented,”  Goldfield  (1989)  refines  the  thesis  by  stressing  the  integral  
role  of  “highly  organized  radical  organizations  not  only  in  organizing  social  protest  
but  in  tactical  and  strategic  planning  as  well”  (Goldfield  1989,  p.  1264).  Unorganized  
and  nebulously  defined  social  movements  do  not  win  concessions;;  highly  organized  
social  movements  with  economic  leverage  often  do.  
Implicit   in   both   of   these  accounts   is   a   conceptualization   of   the   state   as   a  
perpetuator   of   the   long-­term   interests   of   the   capitalist   class.   Working   class  
concessions  are  predicated  solely  on  the  working  class’  ability  to  disrupt  the  routine  
operation  of  the  economy,  not  on  the  state’s  (or  individual  politicians’)  benevolence  
(ibid.   pp.   1274-­1276).14   Hence   the   contraction   or   elimination   of   social   welfare  
policies  after   the  cessation  of  working  class  militancy:   the  impetus  of   the  state  to  
initiate   pro-­working   class   policies   is   eliminated.   While   the   working   class   may  
ostensibly   benefit   from   the   concessionary   policies,   these   benefits   are   entirely  
incidental   to   the  muting   of   civil   disorder   and   the   reestablishment   of   labor/social  
control.   The   concessions   may   not   benefit   capitalists   immediately—in   fact,   by  
definition,  they  do  not—but  by  assuaging  or  removing  the  threat  of  working  class  
                                                
14  Similar  conceptually,  though  ultimately  untenable,  Karl  Polanyi’s  work  ([1944]  
2001)  relies  primarily  upon  the  benevolence  of  the  state  in  assuaging  working  
class  deprivations,  while  largely  ignoring  working  class  agency.  See  Silver  2003,  
pp.  17-­18.    
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militancy,  it  allows  for  the  peaceful  perpetuation  of  capitalist  social  property  relations  
over   time.15   The   reason   for   the   state’s   willingness   to   conform   to   the   long-­term  
interests   of   capitalists,   however,   may   not   be   obvious—especially   if   interpreted  
through  the  lens  of  theories  that  treat  the  state  as  an  “autonomous”  (or  “relatively  
autonomous”)  entity,  such  as  pluralism,  or  the  various  “faces  of  power”  approaches.  
Beyond  several  methodological  errors  inherent  to  theories  of  state  autonomy,  the  
primary  fallacy  of  these  theories  consists  in  decontextualizing  the  state  from  most,  
if  not  all,  of  the  social  processes  that  occur  outside  of  the  state’s  extremely  narrowly  
defined  purview  (see  Peterson  1981;;  Calavita  1984,  pp.  5-­18;;  Goldfield  1989,  pp.  
1259-­1268;;  Goldfield  1990;;  Stone  2012).  Such  a  decontextualization,  among  other  
things,  ignores  the  imperatives  foisted  upon  the  state  by  its  structural  location  in  a  
capitalist  economy.  In  other  words,  the  state  can  only  be  defined  as  autonomous  if  
its  structural  position  is  taken  for  granted—and  thus  unanalyzed.  
While   capitalists   are   often   able   to   dominate   political   affairs   financially—
through   campaign   contributions,   lobbying,   control   of   the   media,   pork-­barreling,  
etc.—and  are  able  to  do  so  successfully  given  the  institutional  biases  of  the  state  
(so-­called   “second   face   of   power”   factors),   theoretical   attempts   to   explain   these  
conditions  often  end  in  question-­begging  and  circular  reasoning  (Bachrach  &  Baratz  
1962;;  Block  1977,  p.  14;;  Koenig  1987).  Indeed,  Calavita  (1984)  regards  such  claims  
as  “not  a  theory  at  all  but  an  empirical  generalization”  (p.  6).  Block’s  (1977)  work  on  
                                                
15  Allen  (2012)  notes  that  capitalists  often  forgo  immediate  benefits  (e.g.,  profits)  to  
guarantee  long-­term  social  control  (Vol.  1,  p.  137).  See,  too,  Stepan-­Norris  &  
Zeitlin  2002,  pp.  134-­136.  
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the   existence   of   a   “ruling   class”   largely   overcomes   these   shortcomings   by  
contextualizing   the  state  within  a  capitalist  economy.  Block  argues   that   there  are  
major  structural  constraints  on  the  agency  of  the  state,  predicated  on  the  necessity  
of  maintaining   a   certain   level   of   funding   (through   taxes   and   borrowing),   and   on  
individual   “state  managers”  maintaining   their  positions  within   the  state   (p.  15).   In  
other   words,   the   continued   existence   of   the   state   depends   upon   the   profitable  
operation  of  the  economy:  short  of  the  nationalization  of  industry,  the  state  can  only  
operate  if  funded  by  taxes  (taken  directly  from  capitalists,  and/or  indirectly  from  the  
workers   they  employ)  and  capital   investments;;  additionally,  support   for   the   ruling  
political  regime  will  “decline  sharply  if  the  regime  presides  over  a  serious  drop  in  the  
level  of  economic  activity,  with  a  parallel  rise  in  unemployment  and  shortages  of  key  
goods”  (ibid.).  As  a  consequence  of  this,  the  likelihood  of  the  regime  being  removed  
from   power   “one   way   or   another”   increases   exponentially   (ibid.).   If   the   primary  
imperatives  of  the  state  are  (a)  to  maintain  levels  of  funding  necessary  for  continued  
operation,  and  (b)  to  maintain  levels  of  support  necessary  for  the  ruling  regime  to  
maintain   their   rule,   then   the   state   must   attend   to   the   long-­term   interests   of   the  
capitalist  class,   regardless  of   individual  politicians’   ideological  commitments.  This  
structural  commitment  to  the   long-­term  interests  of   the  capitalist  class   is  perhaps  
most  vividly  illustrated  by  those  instances  in  which  capitalists  themselves,  pursuing  
their   short-­term   interests,   oppose   policies   meant   to   advance   their   long-­term  
interests.  Put  another  way,  those  cases  in  which  imperatives  (a)  and  (b)  are  the  only  
operative   causes   of   state   action,   not   the   financial   influence   of   capitalists.   A  
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particularly  consequential  example  of  this  was  capital’s  opposition,  especially  after  
1934,  to  the  New  Deal.  As  Piven  &  Cloward  (1993)  put  it,  “when  this  rupture  came,  
Roosevelt  was  outraged,  for  he  saw  himself  and  his  administration  as  the  saviors  of  
capitalism   and   the   business   classes—despite   themselves”   (pp.   84-­85).  
Furthermore,  when  capital  interests  conflict,  as  in  the  tariff  debates  of  the  mid-­19th  
century,   the  state  can  be  relied  upon  to  pursue  the  long-­term  interests  of  capital,  
even   when   facing   intense   opposition   from   certain   sectors   of   the   capitalist   class  

















SECTION  3:  WHITE  SUPREMACY  AS  POSITIVE  CLASS  COMPROMISE  
A  brief  summary  of  what  has  been  established  thus  far  is  perhaps  in  order:  
The  inherently  antagonistic  class  relations  between  workers  and  capitalists  are  often  
perpetuated   and   hegemonized   through   concessionary   compromises.   These  
compromises   are   ‘positive’   if   they   are   predicated   upon   mutually   beneficial  
cooperation,  or   ‘negative’   if   they  are  predicated  upon  an  unstable  modus  vivendi  
wherein  both  parties  are  unsatisfied  with  the  contours  of  the  compromise,  but  abide  
by   its   dictates   to   avoid   bilateral   losses.   The   state,   in   its   structural   role   as   the  
perpetuator  of  the  long-­term  interests  of  the  capitalist  class,  is  often  the  initiator  and  
guarantor  of  these  compromises.  In  this  role,  the  state  responds  to  the  social  unrest  
of   the   working   class,   granting   concessions   to   workers   in   order   to   mitigate   their  
continued   militancy.   Once   the   social/labor   control   necessary   to   perpetuate   the  
profitable   operation   of   the   economy   is   reestablished,   these   concessions   are  
gradually  rescinded,  often  resulting  in  a  new  wave  of  social  unrest.  If  we  move  to  a  
more  concrete  level  of  analysis—specifically  actual  instances  of  class  formation  in  
the  US—such  a  framework  becomes  extremely  useful  in  explaining  various  socio-­
political  phenomena,  e.g.,  the  transformation  and  perpetuation  of  white  supremacy  
in  the  US.    
It   is   my   primary   contention   that   white   supremacy   is   the   principle  method  
through   which   interracial,   class-­based   social   movements   are   mitigated   and  
eliminated   in   the  US.  This  mitigation  subsequently  establishes  sufficient   levels  of  
social/labor  control  to  stably  perpetuate  relatively  peaceful  class  relations  over  time.  
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I  conceptualize  white  supremacy  as  a  positive  class  compromise—rendered  by  the  
state,  but  at  the  behest,  directly  or  indirectly  (structurally),  of  the  capitalist  class—
between  the  white  working  class  and  the  capitalist  class.  The  white  working  class  is  
given  concessions  to  abate  their  level  of  social  unrest  at  the  expense  or  exclusion  
of  the  non-­white  working  class.  While,  as  I  have  stated  previously,  Piven  &  Cloward  
(1993)  and  Goldfield  (1989)  both  demonstrate  the  concessionary  response  of  the  
state  in  periods  of  broad  social  unrest,  these  concessions  are,  critically,  meant  to  
discourage   interracial  solidarity  and  shift  class  antagonisms  horizontally   into  race  
antagonisms   (See   Allen   2012,   Vol.   2,   pp.   258-­259).   The   compromises   which  
constitute   the  ever-­dynamic   regimes  of  white   supremacy  over   time  are   ‘positive’  
because  they  are  mutually  beneficial,  thus  giving  strong  incentives  for  both  parties  
(the  white  working   class   and   the   capitalist   class)   to   perpetuate   the   terms   of   the  
compromise   over   time.   The   white   working   class   benefits   from   the   exclusionary  
concessions,  while  the  capitalist  class  benefits  from  the  cessation/mitigation  of  class  
antagonism  and  the  shift  in  white  working  class  animus—all  at  the  expense  of  the  
non-­white  working  class,  and  the  long-­term  interests  of  the  working  class  as  a  whole.  
The  racially  divisive  concessions  of  the  positive  class  compromise,  while  assuaging  
social  unrest  generally,  also  works  to   impede  interracial  solidarity  by  giving  white  
workers   a   material   basis   for   the   perpetuation   of   the   white   supremacist   regime;;  
creating   the   political   space   necessary   for   the   white   working   class   to   pursue   its  
interests  in  racial  terms,  rather  than  in  class  terms.  The  positive  class  compromise  
of  white  supremacy,  then,  shifts  white  working  class  activism  to  race-­based  socio-­
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political  movements,  the  goals  of  which  are  to  maintain  racial  advantage  relative  to  
non-­whites;;   hence   the   continued   pervasiveness   of   popularly  maintained   political  
regimes   of   racial   exclusion,   as   well   as   racially   repressive,   right-­wing   populist  
movements   (Berlet   &   Lyons   2000).   In   other   words,   white   supremacy   creates   a  
social,   legal,   and   economic   context   wherein   the   immediate   interests   of   white  
workers   consists   in   maintaining   and   expanding   their   racial   advantage   to   the  
disadvantage  of   non-­whites.  Such  a   context   discourages   interracial,   class-­based  
solidarity  by  encouraging  interclass,  race-­based  solidarity.  
Racial  inequality,  then,  is  the  continued  consequence  of  white  supremacist  
regimes   established   to   quell   interracial   class-­based   social   movements.   While  
established  at  the  behest  of  the  capitalist  class  to  ensure  the  long-­term  operation  of  
a  profitable  economy,  it  is  maintained  largely  by  the  white  working  class:  because  
the  structured  incentives  of  the  positive  class  compromise  encourage  race-­based  
class  formation,  white  workers  are  incentivized  to  perpetuate  the  terms  of  the  white  
supremacist  regime—hence,  the  often  virulent  opposition  of  working  class  whites  to  
non-­white  activism.  Like  Wright,  I  illustrate  this  more  concrete  version  of  a  positive  




















Figure  2  is  divided  (vertically)  into  two  parts.  The  first  (left)  section  illustrates  
the  inverse  relationship  between  the  working  class  and  the  capitalist  class.  Rather  
than   a  measure   of   the   associational   power   of   the   working   class,   as   in  Wright’s  
model,   the  x-­axis   represents   the   realization  of   the   interests  of   the  working  class,  
increasing  from  left  to  right.  The  y-­axis  represents  the  realization  of  the  interests  of  
the  capitalist  class,  increasing  from  bottom  to  top.  As  the  realization  of  the  interests  
of  the  working  class  increases,  the  realization  of  the  interests  of  the  capitalist  class  
decreases.  The  point  marked   “I.C.  α”   represents  a  broad,   interracial  class-­based  
social   movement   that   is   quelled   by   the   implementation   of   a   regime   of   white  
supremacy.  It  is  at  this  point  where  the  interests  of  the  white  and  non-­white  working  
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class  diverge.  The  graphed  solid  line  in  this  second  (right)  section  represents  the  
relationship  between  the  realization  of  the  interests  of  the  white  working  class  and  
the  capitalist  class.  Unlike  the  first  section,  as  the  realization  of  the  interests  of  one  
class  increases,  so  does  the  realization  of  the  interests  of  the  other  class;;  denoting  
a   positive   class   compromise.   However,   this   positive   class   compromise   is   only  
possible   if   the   interests   of   the   non-­white   working   class   decrease   concurrently,  
indicated   by   the   dashed   line.   The   point   marked   “I.C.   β”   represents   a   broad,  
interracial   class-­based  social  movement   that   is  not  quelled  by  a   regime  of  white  
supremacy.  At  this  point,  as  the  realization  of  the  interests  of  one  part  of  the  working  
class  increases,  the  realization  of  the  interests  of  the  other  part  of  the  working  class  
increases  as  well—all  at  the  expense  of  the  capitalist  class.    
Since  both  the  white  working  class  and  the  capitalist  class  mutually  benefit  
from  the  terms  of  the  white  supremacist  regimes—represented  by  the  solid  line  from  
I.C.  α  to  the  crest  on  its  right—they  are  both  strongly  incentivized  to  perpetuate  it  
over  time.  Such  a  conceptualization  rejects  simplistic  and  unidimensional  accounts  
that  conceive  of  white  supremacy  as  emanating  solely  from  the  working  class  (e.g.,  
some  versions  of  the  spilt  labor  market  theory),  or  solely  from  the  capitalist  class,  
who  use  their  superstructural  power  to  mystify  the  working  class  from  pursuing  their  
true  interests  with  ideological  racism  (see  Brown  2000).  Non-­whites,  because  the  
mutual  advantage  of  the  white  working  class  and  the  capitalist  class  is  predicated  
on  their  disadvantage,  are  highly  incentivized  to  resist  this  state  of  affairs—and  have  
done   so   historically.   Non-­white  working   class   agency   is   integral   to   this  model—
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unlike  models   based   on   theories   of   structural   racism—as   their   resistance   to   the  
status  quo  of  white  supremacy  is  often  indispensable  to  the  initiation  of  interracial  
class-­based  movements.  As   illustrated  by  both  the  solid   line  and  the  dashed  line  
after  point  I.C.  β,  the  absolute  interests  of  the  working  class  are  tied  inextricably  to  
the  interracial  solidarity  of  the  working  class.  As  stated  previously,  this  indicates  that  
while  white  workers  may  benefit  relative  to  non-­white  workers  under  the  terms  of  


















SECTION  4:  TOWARDS  AN  HISTORICAL  SUBSTANTIATION    
Although  such  a  discussion  will  be,  by  necessity,  cursory  and  partial,   I  will  
now  attempt  fill  in  the  theoretical  ‘blank  spaces’  with  historical  data.  I  focus  on  the  
three  major  regimes  of  white  supremacy  in  the  US:  the  “invention”  of  whiteness  and  
the   racialization  of   slavery   in   the  mid   to   late  17th   century;;   the  establishment  and  
refinement  of  Jim  Crow  from  the  late  19th  century  to  the  early  20th  century;;  and  the  
current  regime  predicated  primarily  upon  de  facto  residential  segregation,  stemming  
from  New  Deal  legislation  like  the  HOLC,  the  FHA,  and  the  VA.  Each  regime  was  
preceded  by  a   largescale,   interracial,  class-­based  social  movement,  and,   in   turn,  
each   of   these   movements   was   ultimately   mitigated   or   eliminated   by   the  
implementation   of   legal   regimes   that   assuaged   white   working   class   militancy  
through   socio-­economic   concessions,   while   discouraging   interracial   solidarity   by  
giving  white  workers  a  material  stake  in  the  white  supremacist  regime.  This  “material  
basis  of  consent”   to   the  positive  class  compromise  often  effectively  shifted  white  
working  class  animus  towards  non-­whites,  rather  than  towards  the  capitalist  class.    
The  “invention”  of  whiteness,  as  Allen  (2012  Vol.  2)  puts  it,  refers  broadly  to  
the   shift   in   colonial   Virginia’s   labor   and   social   policies   from   the  mid   to   late   17th  
century.   This   period   saw   a   major   demographic   transformation   in   the   colony’s  
workforce—predominantly  consisting  of  agricultural   (tobacco)   laborers—from  one  
based  almost  entirely  on  English  and  Irish  indentured  servants,  to  one  based  almost  
entirely   on   African   slaves.   Prior   to   this   shift,   race,   as   a   socially   consequential  
category,  was  largely  nonexistent:  as  Morgan  (2003)  illustrates  in  great  detail,  early  
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colonial  “interracial”  cooperation  between  the  English  and  Africans  “seems  to  have  
been   untroubled   by   racial   prejudice,”   especially   when   it   came   to   servant-­slave  
relations  (p.  13).  The  English  ruling  class  was  more  than  willing,  at  least  initially,  to  
treat   African   “Cimarrons”—settlements   of   escaped   (Spanish)   slaves—on   equal  
footing,  even  romanticizing  them  as  brave  and  noble  liberators  (p.  10-­24).  European  
servants  and  African  slaves  worked  indiscriminately  together,  regularly  fraternized,  
with   interracial   sexual   contact   a   relatively   frequent   phenomenon   (Allen   (Vol.   2)  
reports   that   “fornication”   occurred   disproportionately   between   African  males   and  
European  women  (p.  161)).  European  servants  and  African  slaves  also   regularly  
ran  away  together,  and,  critically,  “provid[ing]  the  supreme  proof  that  the  white  race  
did  not  then  exist,”  rebelled  with  each  other  in  an  attempt  to  abolish  the  economic  
system   that  violently  coerced,  oppressed,  and  exploited  both  groups   (Allen  2012  
Vol.  2  p.  153-­154,  215).  Morgan  (2003)  summarizes  this  state  of  affairs  succinctly  
when  he  says  that  the  color  difference  between  servants  and  slaves  “struck  them  
as   only   skin   deep,”   as   they   “initially   saw   each   other   as   sharing   the   same  
predicament”  (p.  327).  
The  historiographical  debate  centers  around  Morgan’s  ([1975]  2003)  “better  
buy”   thesis   and   Allen’s   (2012)   social   control   thesis.   The   former   claims   that   the  
racialization  of  slavery   in   the  mid-­17th  century—i.e.,   the  phasing-­out  of  European  
indenture  and  the  subsequent  reliance  on  African  slaves  for  agricultural  labor—was  
based  on  the  rising  life  expectancy  of  the  laboring  class,  and  simple  economic  logic:  
African  slaves  were  too  expensive  of  an  investment  in  the  pre-­1660  period  because  
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life  expectancy  was  so   low;;   it  was  simply  cheaper   to   import  (often  coercively)  an  
indentured  servant  who  would  have   little  chance  of  surviving  until   the  end  of  his  
indenture,  than  a  much  more  expensive  lifetime  slave  who  would  live  just  as  long  
(Morgan   2003,   pp.   295-­305).   As   life   expectancy   began   to   grow   after   1660,   the  
opposite   became   true,   as   lifetime   slaves   became   a   better   investment   than  
temporarily   indentured  Europeans  (for  similar  arguments,  see,  Fredrickson  1982,  
pp.   62-­69;;   Breen   1973).   Allen’s   social   control   thesis   claims,   however,   that   the  
racialization   of   slavery   was   predicated   solely   upon   the   imperative   to   control   the  
extremely  rebellion-­prone  workforce  “without  which  no  motive  of  profit…could  have  
had   effect”   (Vol.   I,   p.   1).   Allen   argues   convincingly   that   economic  motives—like  
those  emphasized  by  Morgan—can  only  be  effective  if  the  labor  force  is  sufficiently  
docile   to   ensure   the   continued   operation   of   the   economy.   Allen   claims   that   the  
immediate  impetus  for  the  racialization  of  slavery  was  Bacon’s  Rebellion  (especially  
the  later—1676-­1677—“civil  war”  phase),  a  largescale  and  militant  rebellion  of  both  
indentured   servants   and   African   slaves   against   the   landholding   elite,   which  
culminated   in   the  sacking  and   immolation  of  Jamestown  by   the   interracial   rebels  
(Vol.   II   pp.   203-­222).  As  a   result   of   this   instance  of   largescale,   class-­based  civil  
unrest—and   others,   e.g.,   the   plant-­cutting   riots   of   the   early   1680s—a   system   of  
white   supremacy   was   deliberately   introduced   by   the   colonial   state   wherein  
Europeans  of  the  laboring  class  were  given  a  series  of  privileges  (i.e.,  concessions)  
to  “break  up  the  solidarity  of  black  and  white,”  by  “enlist[ing]  the  poor  whites  in  the  
social   control   apparatus   of   the   ruling   class”   (Allen   1975,   p.   9).   In   other   words,  
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European   laborers—now   white   laborers—were   given   a   material   stake   in   the  
perpetuation  of  the  racialization  of  slavery:  the  first  white  supremacist  regime.16  
Morgan,   while   placing   ultimate   causal   impetus   on   simple   economic   logic,  
concedes  that  the  establishment  of  white  supremacy  was  the  “obvious  if  unspoken  
and   only   gradually   recognized”  means   to   “separate   dangerous   free   whites   from  
dangerous   slave   blacks   by   a   screen  of   racial   contempt”   (p.   328).  Rather   than  a  
conscious  and  deliberate  attempt  by  the  colonial  state  to  foster  interracial  antipathy  
though,  white  supremacy  was  simply  an  unthinking,  but  fortuitous  (for  the  planter  
class)  result  of  the  economically-­driven  racialization  of  slavery.  This  antipathy  was  
later  deliberately  fostered  as  its  utility  in  assuaging  interracial  social  unrest  became  
apparent   (i.e.,   after   Bacon’s   Rebellion)   (ibid.   p.   331,   345).   This   is   to   say   that  
Morgan’s  and  Allen’s  theses  are  less  divergent  than  the  appear  to  be:  both  conceive  
of  the  deliberate  fostering  of  white  supremacist  regimes  as  an  effective  strategy  in  
mitigating  and  eliminating  interracial  solidarity.  Both  argue,  in  different  terms,  that  
white  workers  were  given  social,  political,  psychological,  and  economic  concessions  
by   the  state   in  a  deliberate  attempt   to   “align   [their   interests]  with   their  exploiters”  
(ibid.  p.  344).  White  workers  were  given  a  “material  basis”  to  perpetuate  the  terms  
                                                
16  According  to  Allen  (1975),  “the  white-­skin  privileges  of  the  poor  free  whites  were  
simply  reflexes  of  the  disabilities  imposed  on  the  Negro  slave:  to  move  about  
freely  without  a  pass;;  to  marry  without  any  upper-­class  consent;;  to  change  
employment;;  to  vote  in  elections  in  accordance  with  the  laws  on  qualifications;;  to  
acquire  property;;  and  last  but  not  least,  in  this  partial  list,  the  right  of  self-­defense”  
(p.  11).  The  exclusive  opportunity  to  be  employed  in  those  lucrative  occupations  
that  directly  controlled  slaves  (e.g.,  overseers,  fugitive  slave  hunters,  etc.)  should  
also  be  acknowledged  (ibid.  p.  12).    
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of   the  white  supremacist  regime,  while   the  planter  class  reaped  the  rewards  of  a  
pacified  class  struggle.    
This   version   of   the   white   supremacist   positive   class   compromise   lasted  
largely   unchanged   until   the   Civil  War   and   the   abolition   of   slavery.   I   suggest,   in  
passing  but  with  concurrence  of  W.E.B.  DuBois,  that  the  Civil  War  and  subsequent  
period  of  Reconstruction  comes  closest  to  what  I  have  characterized  as  I.C.  β  in  the  
positive   class   compromise   model;;   representing   an   interracial,   class-­based  
movement  that  is  not  overcome  by  a  regime  of  white  supremacy.  Indeed,  DuBois  
characterizes  Reconstruction  as  a  prospective   “dictatorship  of   labor,”  or,   in  even  
more   radical   terms,   a   “dictatorship   of   the   proletariat”   (see,   for   instance,   DuBois  
[1935]  1998,  p.  583).  As  several  commentators  have  pointed  out,  even   the  post-­
Reconstruction   “Redemption”   period   “did   not…inaugurate   any   revolution   in   the  
customs   of   laws   governing   racial   relations”   (Woodward   [1955]   2002,   p.   31).  
Schwartz  (1988)  is  more  unequivocal  when  he  says  that  “there  were  no  explicitly  
racist  laws,  and  hardly  any  laws  that  were  overtly  racist  in  nature”  adopted  during  
the  period  (p.  9).  Nevertheless,  the  second  major  regime  of  white  supremacy  was  
established  in  the  late  19th  century  in  the  Southern  US,  but  was  not  solidified  as  a  
system  until   the  1920s  (see  Bloom  1987,  p.  52).  According  to   the  now  canonical  
Woodward  thesis,  based  on  C.  Vann  Woodward’s  The  Strange  Career  of  Jim  Crow,  
the   gradual,   state   by   state,   establishment   of   legally-­enforced   segregation   in   the  
South—more   than   15   years   after   the   end   of   Reconstruction—was   a   conscious  
attempt   by   planter-­capitalists   and   Democratic   party   leaders   (often   one   and   the  
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same)  to  disenfranchise  and  disempower  white  and  black  sharecroppers  and  tenant  
farmers   who   had   effectively   organized   both   economically   in   various   Farmers’  
Alliances  and  “Agricultural  Wheels,”  and  politically  as  the  Populist  Party.17  
The   Farmers’   Alliances—interracially   composed   if   not   completely   racially  
integrated  (especially  in  those  states  that  would  later  boast  the  most  repressive  of  
Jim   Crow   regimes,   like   Mississippi;;   see   Schwartz   1988   p.   101)—challenged  
merchant   and   landlord   dominance   of   the   Southern   cotton   economy   through  
cooperative   crop   marketing,   cooperative   stores,   opposition   (through   boycott)   to  
monopoly  and  land  enclosure  (for  cattle),  while  allying  itself  with  the  broader  labor  
movement   (i.e.,   the   Knights   of   Labor)   (McMath   1975,   pp.   17-­24).   McMath  
characterized   the   Alliances   as   the   “largest,   most   violently   class-­oriented   labor  
upheaval”  in  the  history  of  the  South  (p.  22);;  Bloom  (1987),  citing  a  contemporary  
observer,  similarly  characterizes  the  movement—which  enrolled  at  least  1.5  million  
members  at  its  peak  in  1891—as  the  “menace  of  black  and  white  lower  class  united  
against   [the   white   elite’s]   rule…the   most   dangerous   and   insidious   foe   of   white  
supremacy”   (pp.   42,   48).18   The   movement   later   congealed   into   the   extremely  
successful   Populist   Party,   winning   state   and   national   elections   throughout   the  
South,  notably  sweeping  both  houses  of  North  Carolina’s  General  Assembly  in  1894  
(Korstad   2003,   p.   50).   The   party’s   platform—at   least   rhetorically   anti-­capitalist—
                                                
17  The  Woodward  thesis  was  confirmed  by  various  subsequent  historical  and  
empirical  studies,  the  best  of  which  are  Cell  1985;;  James  1988;;  Kousser  1975;;  
Korstad  2003;;  Bloom  1987.  
18  See,  too,  Cell  (1985)  who  describes  the  movement  as  “the  most  significant  
internal  challenge  to  the  hegemony  of  white  supremacy  until  the  1960s”  (p.  123).    
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specifically  included  the  “regulation  of  trusts,  revision  of  the  lien  laws  in  favor  of  the  
farmers,   lowered   interest  rates,  extension  of  public  schools…,  removal  of  convict  
labor,   an   end   to   child   labor,   and   state   regulation   of   the   measurement   of   the  
production  of  miners”  (Bloom  1987,  p.  39).  The  movement  eventually  succumbed  to  
elite   cooptation,   legal   disenfranchisement   of   its   poor   black  and  white   supporters  
(initially  through  widespread  violence  and  voter  suppression),  and  the  new  positive  
class  compromise  of  Jim  Crow  segregation  (Cell  1985,  p.  153).  Popular  movements  
predicated  upon  interracial  solidarity  became  nearly  impossible,  as  white  workers  
were  given  a  material,  social,  and  psychological  stake  in  the  perpetuation  of  racial  
inequality.  Subsequent   radical  movements   in   the  South  were   largely  denuded  by  
their  own  dedication  to  the  Jim  Crow  regime;;  for  instance,  the  Socialist  movement  
of  the  early  20th  century  (led  at  least  partially  by  the  former  left-­wing  of  the  Populist  
Party)   tried   to   “outnigger”   the  Democratic  Party   in   an  attempt   to   gain  and   retain  
supporters  (Green  1980,  p.  47;;  see,  too,  Foley  1997).    
While   the   legal   segregation  of   Jim  Crow  would   be  eliminated  by   the  Civil  
Rights  movement  in  the  1960s,  the  third  major  regime  of  white  supremacy,  based  
primarily   on   de   facto   residential   segregation—which   ultimately   determines   other  
aspects   of   racial   inequality   like   the   quality   of   public   schools,   access   to   jobs,  
transportation,   healthcare,   etc.—was  established   in   the  1930s  by   the  New  Deal.  
Often  lauded  by  liberal  commentators  as  the  pinnacle  of  progressive  politics  in  the  
US,  the  origins  of  the  New  Deal  are  grounded  firmly  in  reactionary  attempts  to  stem  
interracial  working  class  militancy,  partially  through  the  safeguarding  and  expansion  
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of  racial  inequality.  The  extensive  expansion  of  interracial  unionism—made  possible  
by  Communist  Party  USA  activism  and  leadership;;  first  through  their  own  unions,  
then  through  the  CIO—as  well  as  the  growth  of  large  interracial  social  movements—
the   CP-­led   Unemployment   Councils   would   be   the   most   consequential—led   a  
decisive   portion   of   the   capitalist   class   to   support   the   moderate   reforms   of   the  
Roosevelt   administration   (Stepan-­Norris   &   Zeitlin   2002;;   Goldfield   forthcoming).  
Quite   literally   fearing   revolution,  New  Deal  Democrats,  Progressive  Republicans,  
and  individual  capitalists  “thought  government  reforms  were  immediately  necessary  
to   avoid   more   radical   demands   and   activity”   (Goldfield   1989,   p.   1275).   These  
“reforms”  took  the  shape  of  widespread  working  class  concessions  (e.g.,  Wagner  
Act,  Social  Security,  etc.).  However,  the  concessions  applied  almost  exclusively  to  
whites,  as  Congressional  Southern  Democrats  would  only  acquiesce  to  New  Deal  
legislation  if  it  did  not  affect  the  basis  of  the  Southern  economy:  a  cheap  and  docile  
supply  of  non-­white  labor  (Katznelson  2005;;  2013).    
Nevertheless,  the  racialization  of  New  Deal  policies  like  the  Wagner  Act  or  
the   Social   Security   Act   are,   at   best,   secondary   factors   in   the   current   white  
supremacist   regime.  Much  more  consequential  are   the  various   federal  mortgage  
policies,  beginning  with  the  establishment  of  the  Home  Owners’  Loan  Corporation  
in   1933,   and   the   subsequent   adoption   of   its   racialized   policies   by   the   Federal  
Housing   Administration   and   the   Veterans   Administration   (Dreier,   Mollenkopf,   &  
Swanstrom  2014,  p.  104).  These  policies  received  widespread,  bipartisan  support—
the  Home  Owners’  Loan  Act  of  1933,  for  instance,  passed  the  House  383-­4.  This  
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decidedly  contradicts  Katznelson’s  (2013)  claim  that  “no  noteworthy  lawmaking  the  
New   Deal   accomplished   could   have   passed   without   [the   Southern   Democrats’]  
consent”  (p.  16).19  In  any  case,  mortgage  laws  would  not  have  affected  the  price  or  
docility  of   the  South’s  non-­white  workforce,   so   there  was   little   incentive   to  break  
party  rank  and  oppose  them.  As  such,  the  mortgage  laws  were  not  subject  to  the  
limiting  effect  of  the  “southern  cage,”  as  Katznelson  claims  (ibid.).  In  other  words,  
the  Southern  economy,  and  the  Jim  Crow  regime  that  made  it  possible,  were  not  
responsible  for  the  racialization  of  the  HOLC,  the  FHA,  or  the  VA.  
In  almost  every  account  of  the  racialized  operation  of  the  New  Deal  mortgage  
policies  it  is  alleged  that  the  laws  simply  codified  private  market  practice.  Sharkey’s  
(2013)  account  is  typical:  “the  federal  government  adopted  a  set  of  standards  set  by  
the   real  estate   industry   to   rank   the   riskiness  of  potential   loans”   (p.  59,  emphasis  
added).   However,   as   Kimble   (2007)   carefully   demonstrates,   the   FHA   “went   far  
beyond   merely   acquiescing   to   racial   discrimination”   and   “explicitly   intended   to  
isolate   blacks   in   urban   neighborhoods”   (p.   400).   Quoting   Arnold   Hirsch,   Kimble  
concludes  that  “a  conscious,  deliberate  choice  for  segregation   lay  at   the  heart  of  
national   policy”   (p.   401).   Indeed,   northern   segregation   levels   actually   decreased  
during  the  20-­year  period  prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Home  Owners’  Loan  Act  (ibid.  
p.   422).   From   their   inception,   the   federal   mortgage   policies   created   market  
                                                
19  It  should  be  noted  that  both  Katznelson  (2005)  and  Katznelson  (2013)  
completely  ignore  the  effects  of  the  mortgage  policies.  Interestingly,  the  only  
mention  of  the  FHA  in  Katznelson  (2013)  is  a  reference  to  his  earlier  (2005)  work,  
stating  that  “missing  from  that  book,  however,  was  a  discussion  of  how  housing  
segregation  was  encouraged  by  the  Federal  Housing  Administration”  (p.  24).    
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incentives   for   whites   to   perpetuate   residential   segregation,   not   the   other   way  
around.   Since   homeownership   for   whites   requiring   financial   assistance   (i.e.,  
loans/mortgages)  was  predicated  on  their  neighborhoods  maintaining  a  white-­only  
residency,  whites  were  given  a  major   incentive   to  exclude  non-­whites,  especially  
through  the  establishment  of  racially  restrictive  covenants  (which  were  encouraged  
if  not  required  by  the  FHA  anyway)  (ibid.  412).  Subsequently,  the  FHA  has  “actively  
disguised   its   leadership   in   advancing   a   nationwide   segregationist   agenda   by  
deflecting  blame  onto  the  private  market   for  policies  that   it  had  standardized  and  
mandated”   (ibid.   p.   400).  Unfortunately,   scholars   of   residential   segregation   have  
largely  bought  into  this  revision  of  history.    
What   is   critically   missing   from   accounts   of   residential   racial   segregation  
stemming   from   New   Deal   housing   policies   (i.e.,   virtually   every   account   in   the  
structural  racism  paradigm)  is  a  contextualization  of  these  policies  within  the  larger  
goals   and   trends   of   the   New   Deal.   The   New   Deal   was   an   attempt   to   stave   off  
interracial   working   class   militancy   through   moderate   concessions.   The   housing  
policies   of   the   New   Deal   were   part   and   parcel   of   that   attempt.   Crucially,   these  
policies  deliberately  favored  whites  over  non-­whites,  giving  whites  strong  incentives  
to  pursue  their  interests  in  racial,  rather  than  class  based  terms.  This  is  the  basis  for  






SECTION  5:  CONCLUSION  
In  this  thesis,  I  have  developed  a  model  of  positive  class  compromise  that  
describes  the  perpetuation  and  evolution  of  white  supremacy  in  the  US.  This  model  
overcomes  the  methodological  shortcomings  of  theories  grounded  in  the  structural  
racism  paradigm,  namely  by  locating  the  causal  impetus  of  racial  inequality  in  the  
capitalist   state’s   attempt   to   mitigate   working   class   militancy.   The   positive   class  
compromise  of  white  supremacy,  while  initiated  at  the  behest  of  the  capitalist  class,  
provides  strong  incentives  for  both  the  white  working  class  and  the  capitalist  class  
to  perpetuate  its  terms.  In  other  words,  the  positive  class  compromise  provides  a  
“material   basis”   for   both   parties   to   perpetuate   the   white   supremacist   regime.  
Additionally,  while  remaining  situated  within  the  methodological  bounds  laid  out  by  
Bonilla-­Silva  (1997),  the  model  avoids  the  pitfalls  of  other  class-­based  theories  of  
race   by   eschewing   one-­sided   explanations:   specifically   the   orthodox   Marxist  
approaches  that  consider  race  a  “superstructural”  phenomenon  that  mystifies  the  
working  class  from  pursuing  their  material   interests,  and  the  “bottom-­up”  theories  
that   ignore   both   the   state   and   the   capitalist   class’   role   in   establishing   white  
supremacist  regimes.    
Largely  unanalyzed  in  the  above,  though,  is  the  role  of  individual  employers  
in  buttressing  the  socio-­political  regimes  of  white  supremacy.  While  I  have  focused  
on   largescale   class-­based   social   movements,   and   the   legal   regimes   of   white  
supremacy  that  work  to  liquidate  them,  individual  employers  have  continuously  used  
a  similar   logic   to  defeat  unionization  efforts.  Though   this   tactic,   characterized  as  
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“race  management”  by  Roediger  &  Esch  (2014),  makes  little  sense  outside  of  the  
context  of  the  causes  and  consequences  of  the  legal  regimes  of  white  supremacy,  
it  has  served  as  a  fundamental  supplement  to  these  regimes  in  a  basically  unaltered  
form  since  the  racialization  of  slavery.  Black  strikebreaking,  and  the  displacement  
of   white   workers   with   non-­white   workers   as   “strike   insurance”   continues   to  
exacerbate   racial   antagonisms,  while   discouraging   the   interracial   solidarity   often  
necessary  for  worker  organization  (see  Whatley  1993;;  Roediger  2010).  The  current  
widespread   displacement   of   white   workers   with   Hispanic   workers,   and   the  
consequent   rise   of   right-­wing   populism,   can   be   usefully   interpreted   through   this  
analytical   lens,   rather   than   through   the   denials   and   shibboleths   of   journalistic  
accounts  (Berlet  &  Lyons  2000;;  Melcher  &  Goldfield  forthcoming).  Case  studies  in  
race  management  and  their  effect  on  unionization  efforts  and  general  racial  attitudes  
are  a  much  more   fruitful   avenue  of   research   than   the   current,   largely  ahistorical  
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In  this  thesis,  I  develop  a  theoretical  frame  through  which  the  perpetuation  of  
racial   inequality   in   the   United   States   can   be   fruitfully   interpreted.   This  
reconceptualization  is  necessary,  I  argue,  because  the  now  dominant  paradigm  of  
so-­called   “structural   racism”   is   methodologically   untenable.   I   contend   that   the  
seminal   theoretical   and   empirical   accounts   within   the   paradigm   do   not   provide  
compelling   or  methodologically   sound  explanations   for   the   perpetuation   of   racial  
inequality,  often  (and  disturbingly)  ignoring  the  historical  record  of  race  relations  in  
the   US.   Specifically,   I   show   that   these   accounts   rely   on   the   dubious   causal  
mechanisms   of   structural   inertia   or   ideological   racism.   Where   these   pitfalls   are  
avoided  or  otherwise  acknowledged,  the  paradigm  is  still   insufficient  in  explaining  
the  persistence  of  racial  inequality  because  it  either  consciously  or  unconsciously  
avoids   contextualizing   the   current   regime   of   racial   inequality   within   the   larger  
historical   role   of   race   in   American   history.   I   attempt   to   remedy   these   issues   by  
locating  the  causal  impetus  of  racialized  social  structures  in  the  class  relations  of  
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the  US.  I  argue  that,  broadly  speaking,  workers  pursue  their  interests  collectively  in  
one  of  two  ways:  through  race  and  gender  inclusive,  class-­based  organizations,  or  
through   exclusionary   race   and   gender-­based   organizations.   To   combat   the  
possibility   or   reality   of   the   former,   employers   and   the   state—separately   and   in  
conjunction—have   historically   incentivized   and   encouraged   the   latter   to   avoid  
potential  shifts  in  the  balance  of  class  power.  I  model  this  relationship  using  what  
Erik   Olin  Wright   (2000)   has   described   as   a   “positive   class   compromise.”  White  
supremacy,  then,  in  its  various  iterations  and  guises,  is  one  of  the  primary  processes  
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